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The proliferation of computer software has been accompanied
by the equally prolific growth of a new crime: piracy of software.
While this growth can be explained in part by the ease of pirating
software, much of it is caused by the inadequacy of weapons available to software owners to combat pirates. Remedies typically available against software pirates are insufficient to deter the pirate, who
t
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is usually back in business a short time after having been caught. A
potent weapon that offers substantial sanctions is available, however. This weapon is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, better known as "RICO."' Until recently, the criminal
provisions of the statute were virtually the only source of RICO litigation. Only in recent years have private parties begun to supplement antitrust, securities and common law claims with charges
based on RICO.
I.

RICO AND SOFTWARE PROTECTION

Remedies under RICO are available to software owners who
have obtained copyright or trade secret protection on their software.
This assertion may not be obvious upon initial reading of RICO, as
there is no mention of infringing or counterfeiting copyrights or
stealing trade secrets within the Act. RICO lists predicate acts or
crimes (racketeering activities) 2 that are punishable under existing
federal or state laws. A plaintiff must establish that a pattern of one
or more of these racketeering activities was committed in order to
prove a RICO violation. Although no copyright or trade secret violations are listed as racketeering activities under 18 U.S.C. § 1961, 3 at
least one of four activities listed under the section will occur in almost every copyright counterfeiting or trade secret misappropriation situation. These four activities are:
4
(1) mail fraud
(2) wire fraud 5
(3) interstate transportation of stolen property; 6 and7
(4) receiving stolen property transported interstate.
A violator of a copyright or trade secret may violate RICO by
committing one or more of these four racketeering activities. Accordingly, the first question one should ask is whether a pattern of
one or more of these four activities has occurred.
II.

RACKETEERING ACTIVITIES UNDER RICO

This section explains the four racketeering activities common to
cases of copyright counterfeiting and trade secret misappropriation.
1. 18
2. 18
3. 18
otherwise
4. 18
5. 18
6. 18
7. 18

U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
U.S.C. § 1961 (1982). All sections referenced herein refer to 18 U.S.C. unless
noted.
U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
U.S.C. § 2314 (1982).
U.S.C. § 2315 (1982).
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An understanding of these activities is vital to determining whether
a RICO violation has occurred.

A.

MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD

The mail 8 and wire 9 fraud statutes are two of the broadest statutes incorporated in RICO that designate racketeering activities. 10
These statutes can be the basis for a RICO action where mail or
wire is used to perpetrate a fraud. For example, a RICO action can
be based on these statutes where mail or wire is employed to offer
counterfeit software or stolen trade secrets to a potential purchaser,
to cash checks received as payment for counterfeit software or stolen trade secrets, or to transmit communications between
conspirators.
The language of the mail fraud statute is particularly applicable
to copyright counterfeiting actions, as the statute prohibits anyone
from selling, distributing or furnishing for unlawful use any "counterfeit article."" This language supports the argument that the legis8. The mail fraud statute sets forth the following pertinent language:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange,
alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any
counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything
represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious
article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so
to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or
takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to
be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at
which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed,
any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
9. The wire fraud statute sets forth the following pertinent language:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
10. Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO In The Public Interest: "Everybody's
Darling," 19 AM. CRnM. L. REV. 655, 658 (1982). See also United States v. States, 488
F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974) ("[t]he definition of fraud
in § 1341 is to be broadly and liberally construed to further the purpose of the
statute").
11. See supra note 8.
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lature intended that this statute be applicable to counterfeit
software protected by a copyright.
The elements of proof of mail fraud and wire fraud are essentially the same, except proof of wire fraud requires proof of an interstate communication whereas proof of mail fraud does not. 12 To
establish either mail or wire fraud, plaintiff must prove:
(1) a scheme or artifice to defraud;
(2) a use of mail or wire for the purpose of executing the scheme;
and
(3) a culpable participation in that use of mail or wire by defendant either by making use of mail or wire himself or by know13
ingly causing someone else to make the use.
Software piracy can often be classified as fraud since the concept of fraud is broadly defined. As one court explained:
[W]e recognize that the forms of fraud are as multifarious as
human ingenuity can devise; that courts consider it difficult, if not
impossible, to formulate an exact, definite and all-inclusive definition thereof; and that each case must be determined on its own
facts. In general, and in its generic sense, fraud comprises all acts,
conduct, omissions and concealment involving breach of a legal or
14
equitable duty and resulting in damage to another.
Schemes to make or sell counterfeit software or to steal trade
secrets in software form clearly fall within this description. For example, unauthorized interception of trade secrets (such as software)
communicated by telephone between remote terminals and a main
computer defrauds the owner and violates the wire fraud statute. 5
Such a scheme also takes the software owner's money (by causing
the owner to lose sales) and property by false or fraudulent pretenses. In addition, if it can be established that there is a duty to
disclose material information to the purchaser, the unknowing purchaser of the stolen software is defrauded when the pirate or in6
fringer conceals the material fact that the software is stolen.
Advertising that includes false statements about software also
12. Parrish, RICO Civil Remedies: An Untapped Resource For Insurers,49 INS.
Coups. J. 337, 343 (1982). See also United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir.
1977) ("Judicial decisions construing § 1341 are applicable to § 1343").
13. United States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828
(1970).
14. Isaacs v. United States, 301 F.2d 706, 713 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
818 (1962).
15. United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922
(1979).
16. See United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 651 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 977 (1976).
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may be a violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes.' 7 A seller is
permitted to engage in puffing or innocent exaggeration of the quality of his wares but if he goes beyond this, and uses mail or other
interstate communication facilities in doing so, he may be engaging
in fraudulent acts prohibited under sections 1341 and 1343.18
Proof of mail or wire fraud does not require proof that the defendant intended to use mail or interstate communication facilities
in furtherance of the scheme. The plaintiff need only prove that the
mail or interstate communication facilities were used to carry out
the scheme, and that the use was reasonably foreseeable even
though it was not actually intended.' 9 If the defendant merely
"causes" the use, he is chargeable. 20 For example, if an innocent
purchaser pays for stolen software by check and the check, in its
transmission between banks, is sent through the mail, section 1341
applies. 2' The matter mailed or transmitted need not be fraudulent
in itself; it is enough that it aids in the execution of the fraudulent
22
scheme.
It is not necessary that a mailing or wire transmission take
place between the pirate and the victim. Any mailing or wire transmission made in connection with the fraudulent scheme is sufficient. 23 Mailings or wire transmissions between participants in a
piracy scheme, even if only used incidentally to inform co-schemers
24
of the progress of the plan, can be sufficient to violate the statutes.
If mail or wire fraud is alleged, however, the plaintiff must describe
the contents of the mailings or wires with particularity, including
the dates they were made and how they relate to the scheme
to de25
fraud. Otherwise, the cause of action may be dismissed.

B. TRANSPORTING AND RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
Two other activities designated as racketeering activities under
17. United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423, 428 (2d Cir. 1966) (misrepresentation
concerning a diet plan), cert. denied,385 U.S. 1001 (1967).
18. See generally Comment, Mail Fraud-FraudulentMisrepresentationsMust Be
Distinguished From "Puffing" or "Sellers Talk" In Offenses Under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 22
S.C.L. REV 434 (1970).
19. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1,.8 (1954); United States v. Stafford, 589 F.2d
285, 295 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979).
20. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9 (1954).
21. United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1179 (2d Cir. 1970).
22. United States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
23. United States v. International Term Papers, Inc., 477 F.2d 1277, 1279 (1st Cir.
1973).
24. United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 483 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
820 (1978).
25. County of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902, 921 (N.D. IL 1983).
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RICO are transporting and receiving stolen 2 6 goods valued at five
thousand dollars or more. 27 The purpose of this designation was to
insure that RICO can reach all means by which owners might be
wrongfully deprived of the use or benefits of their property. 28
Whether RICO protects software owners against these activities
depends upon whether software is included under the statutory language of "goods, wares [or] merchandise." Courts have decided
that this language does include software.
In United States v. Sam Goody, Inc.,29 a copyright counterfeit
action was brought under section 2314. The defendant had transported (across state lines) and sold counterfeit tapes. The court
held that the intangible aggregation of sounds comprising a recorded musical work constituted goods that could be stolen, converted or taken by fraud within the meaning of section 2314.30 The
court ruled that the phrase "stolen, converted or taken by fraud"
covers all forms of wrongful taking.3 1 Based upon this interpretation, the court held that infringing a copyright by making unauthorized duplications of copyrighted musical works qualifies as stealing,
converting or taking by fraud under section 2314.32
Sections 2314 and 2315 have also been applied in actions for misappropriation of trade secrets. In United States v. Seagraves,33 an
action for misappropriation of trade secrets was brought under section 2314. In Seagraves, geophysical maps had been stolen, transported interstate and sold. The court held that the terms "goods,
wares [and] merchandise" were general designations of chattels
26. "Stolen" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 2312 has been defined as including "all felonious takings... with intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of whether or not the theft constitutes common-law larceny." United
States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 417 (1957).
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314, 2315 (1982). The pertinent portion of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 allows
an action against anyone who "transports in interstate or foreign commerce any
goods, wares, merchandise . . . of the value of $5000 or more, knowing the same to
have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud." The pertinent portion of 18 U.S.C
§ 2315 provides: "Whoever receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any
goods, wares, or merchandise, securities, or money of the value of $5,000 or more, ...
moving as, or which are a part of, or which constitute interstate or foreign commerce,
knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken,.. . [sIhall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
28. United States v. Evans, 579 F.2d 360, 361 (4th Cir. 1978) (quoting Lyda v.
United States, 279 F.2d 461, 464 (5th Cir. 1960)).
29. 506 F. Supp. 380 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
30. Id. at 386.
31. Id. at 390.
32. Id. at 391.
33. 265 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1959).
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which are ordinarily a subject of commerce. 34 Thus the court ruled
the maps were goods, wares or merchandise within the terms of sec35
tion 2314 since maps of the type involved were frequently sold.
In a similar ruling, the court in United States v. Greenwala36
ruled that secret chemical formulae fall within the statutory language of "goods, wares [or] merchandise" and that the theft of such
formulae was punishable under section 2314.
The defendant in United States v. Bottone37 argued that what he
stole, transported and sold were merely copies of a secret manufacturing process rather than the process itself, and that copies were
not goods under section 2314. The court held that the scope of the
statute encompassed copies of a secret as well as the original
38
secret.
Like the mail and wire fraud statutes, sections 2314 and 2315
have been broadly construed. These statutes apply not only to interstate commerce, but also to transportation into the United States
from a foreign country. 39 In addition, since both the sender and receiver of stolen or converted goods are liable, these statutes substantially increase the number of parties a software owner can sue.
The essential elements of proof of a violation of sections 2314
and 2315 are:
1) interstate transportation of stolen, converted, or fraudulently taken goods valued at $5,000 or more;
2) fraudulent intent; 4° and
3) knowledge that the goods have been stolen, converted, or
41
fraudulently taken.
III.

UNDERSTANDING A RICO COMPLAINT

Once it has been determined that one or more racketeering activities might have occurred, the victim should consider filing a
RICO complaint. To prepare the complaint properly, certain features of RICO must be understood.
34. Id. at 880.
35. Id. See also United States v. Gottesman, 724 F.2d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1984).
36. 479 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973).
37. 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966).
38. Id. at 394.
39. United States v. Davis, 608 F.2d 555, 556 (5th Cir. 1979).
40. United States v. Freeman, 619 F.2d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450
U.S. 910 (1981).
41. United States v. Graves, 669 F.2d 964, 970 (5th Cir. 1982).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

A.

ELEMENTS OF

[Vol. V

RICO

No racketeering activity is prohibited per se under RICO; rather,

section 1962 prohibits any person from:
receiving income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity and using the income to acquire an interest in an enterprise, 42 or
(2) acquiring through a pattern of racketeering activity an interest
in or control of an enterprise, 43 or
(3) conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity," or
(4) conspiring to commit any of the above three offenses. 45
In a software piracy action, the typical RICO violation is that the
affairs of an enterprise have been conducted through a pattern of
racketeering activity.46 To establish a civil violation of RICO, and
specifically a violation of section 1962(c), the plaintiff must prove all
of the following(1) that a person;
(2) through a pattern of racketeering activity (such as mail fraud,
wire fraud, or transportation or receipt of stolen goods);
(3) directly or indirectly participated in;
(4) an enterprise, the activities of which affect interstate
47
commerce.
Each of these elements will be examined to explain how one
should plead a civil RICO action or count.
(1)

1. Person
RICO defines "person" as including "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. '48 This
definition is broad enough to include almost any counterfeiter or
misappropriator of software.
2.

Direct or Indirect Participation

A person able to commit racketeering activities solely by virtue
of that person's position in an enterprise or involvement in or con42.
43.
44.
45.

18
18
18
18

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§
§
§
§

1962(a)
1962(b)
1962(c)
1962(d)

(1982).
(1982).
(1982).
(1982).

46. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
47. Long, Treble Damages For Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis and Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DiCK. L REV.
201, 211 (1981).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982).
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trol over the affairs of the enterprise is subject to RICO's civil provisions. 4 9 Examples of relationships between a person and an
enterprise that will render that person liable under RICO are:
(1) an investor in an enterprise;
(2) a controlling party in an enterprise;
(3) an employee or associate of an enterprise; and
(4) a conspirator in a conspiracy to maintain the position of an in50
vestor, controller, employee or associate in an enterprise.
These types of relationships indicate that the statute covers
more than just those persons who manage or operate an enterprise.
Indirect participation by employees is also prohibited.5 1 This exposes to liability not only the top echelon of an operation but also
salesmen, agents, engineers and others who are involved in the operation's daily activities.
It is unclear, however, what relationship must exist between the
racketeering activity and the person's association with the enterprise for there to be a violation of the statute. Judicial opinions vary
as to when an employee, in the course of employment, has engaged
in racketeering activities outside the scope of the usual affairs of the
52
enterprise.
The defendant in a RICO action is the "person" who has engaged in conduct defined as unlawful by section 1962. Unlawful conduct, such as mail fraud, perpetrated by a lower-level corporate
executive acting without corporate sanction makes the executive,
not the coporation, liable under RICO.5 3 For the corporation to be
liable, it must have participated "in the conduct of.. . affairs..."
as required by section 1962(c) under a theory such as respondeat
superior.m
49. United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980).
50. Parrish, supra note 12, at 341 n.23.
51. United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
52. Compare United States v. Gibson, 486 F. Supp. 1230, 1244 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (defendant's conduct must involve the affairs of the enterprise rather than defendant's
personal affairs) and United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
(offenses must relate to the essential functions of the enterprise) with United States
v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 785-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (racketeering activity need not be
part of daily business operation of an enterprise).
53. Parnes v. Heinold, 548 F. Supp. 20,28 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
54. Id. at 30. RICO does not hold the enterprise liable, only those persons who
seek to participate in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity. D & G Enter. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 574 F. Supp. 263, 270 (N.D. hi.
1983). At least one court has required that the defendant has participated in the affairs of the enterprise. Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1983).
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Pattern of Racketeering Activity

A person must participate in a pattern of racketeering activities
in order to violate RICO. For a "pattern" to exist, section 1961(5) requires "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which
occurred within ten years. . . after the commission of a prior act of
racketeering activity." In an action for misappropriation of trade secret or copyright piracy, a pattern of racketeering activity can be
proven easily. Proof of only two mailings or wires, for example, is
55
sufficient.
The statutory language does not require that the two racketeering activities be related.5 6 Courts are divided on whether racketeering activities must be related for a pattern to exist.57 The accepted
view is that sporadic activity does not constitute a pattern of racketeering activity,5 8 and that to form a pattern, the racketeering activities must be connected either by having some common scheme, plan
or motive or by having similar purposes, results, participants, victims or methods of commission.5 9 Some courts also require that the
racketeering activities 60comprising the pattern be related to the affairs of the enterprise.
4.

Enterprise

Another essential element of any RICO cause of action is the
existence of an enterprise. Section 1961(4) defines "enterprise" as
including "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity." The courts have consistently
public or private, corheld that an enterprise may be legal or illegal,
61
porate or individual, domestic or foreign.
55. United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 602 (7th Cir. 1978).
56. Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 10, at 657.
57. Compare United States v Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (predicate acts must be connected with each other by some common scheme, plan or motive) uith United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 953 (1978) (interrelation of acts not implied by statutory language).
58. CORNELL INSTrrUTE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, MATERIALS ON RICO 114 (1970).
59. Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 10, at 657 n.19.
60. United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 850-52 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 951 (1978).
61. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981) (the term "enterprise" as
used in RICO encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises); United
States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 889 (5th Cir. 1978) (informal association of individuals
controlling a secret criminal network is an enterprise within the meaning of RICO),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1092 (3d Cir.
1977) (state agency enforcing tax laws on an interstate industry is an enterprise
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Congress intended the term "enterprise" to have a very broad
meaning. 62 Consequently, an enterprise may consist of a group of
individuals informally organized for a common purpose 63 as well as
a group of corporations. 64 RICO is sufficiently broad to apply even
in those situations where an individual, rather than a group of indi65
viduals or an organization, is the enterprise.
RICO requires that the activity of the enterprise affect interstate
commerce. That requirement is met whenever the enterprise's activity affects interstate commerce, regardless of whether the activity
is non-racketeering activity, 66 racketeering activity,67 or activities

not involving the individual defendant. 68 An enterprise that counterfeits copyrights or misappropriated trade secrets affects interstate
commerce not only if the copies or stolen trade secrets move in interstate commerce, but also if local purchasers of the goods buy
those goods with funds that would have been used to purchase
69
other goods or services in interstate commerce.
B.

ADVANTAGES OF RICO ACTIONS

Application of RICO to software cases is a new development.
Many conservative software owners may question why they should
assert a RICO count in a copyright counterfeiting or trade secret
misappropriation action. The most obvious reason is that a successful plaintiff in a RICO action is entitled to mandatory awards of
within the meaning of RICO), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1977); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 439 (2d Cir. 1974) (foreign corporation is an enterprise within the
meaning of RICO), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1104 (1975); United States v. DePalma, 461 F.
Supp. 778, 785-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (racketeering activity need not be part of day to day
business operation of an enterprise).
62. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1974); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 953 (1978).
63. CORNELL INSTrruTE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 58, at 112.
64. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
927 (1980).
65. Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 1,
14-15 (1978); 18 U.S.C. §1961(4) (1982) defines "enterprise" to include "any
individual."
66. United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 443 U.S.
946 (1979).
67. Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, 713 F.2d 1272, 1289 (7th Cir.
1983).
68. United States v. Groff, 643 F.2d 396, 400 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 545 U.S.
828 (1981).
69. United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276, 283 (7th Cir. 1983).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. V

treble damages, 70 reasonable attorneys fees 7 1 and costs. 72

A purpose of these mandatory sanctions is to deter potential violators who, in cases of organized crime, often rely on cash reserves
of the criminal organization to insulate themselves from less severe
sanctions imposed under other statutes. 73 Generous mandatory
awards also increase the likelihood of private plaintiffs filing RICO
actions despite the expense, annoyance and uncertainty of results,
74
thereby lessening the burden on the government.
In addition to treble damages, costs and attorneys fees is another interesting sanction; commentators have argued that section
1964(a) provides for equitable relief. The relief authorized is remedial, not punitive, and of the type traditionally granted by courts of
equity. It is the same kind of relief that federal courts have been
granting in civil actions brought under section 4 of the Sherman Act
and section 15 of the Clayton Act. 75

Section 1964(a), say the com-

mentators, authorizes the trial court to enter interim orders pending
final resolution of the case. These orders include preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders, which are valuable and
often necessary in76cases involving software piracy and trade secret
misappropriation.
At least one district court has held, however, that no equitable
relief is available in private civil RICO actions. 77 Until this issue is
resolved, reliance on a civil RICO action is risky where injunctive
relief is the principal remedy sought.
Who is qualified to seek treble damages, attorneys fees, costs
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). A recent decision has substantially increased the
interest in civil RICO actions. A district court for the first time has awarded treble
damages in a private action. Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright Refining Co., 577 F. Supp. 339, 348
(D.N.J. 1983).
.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). But see Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v.
Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (attorneys fees not awarded in a civil
RICO action where the suit was settled after a preliminary injunction was entered
but before a final judgment on the merits).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982); Parrish, supra note 12, at 349.
73. Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of JudicialRestriction, 95
HARv. L. REV. 1101, 1112 (1982).
74. Id. at 1113 n.66.
75. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1974).
76. Note, RICO's Enforcement Provisions: An Interpretative Analysis, 15 SuFFoLK
U. L. REV. 941, 973 (1981); A preliminary injunction was entered in Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
77. Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576, 581-84 (N.D. 111. 1983). A second district court has indicated it would have reached the same conclusion if there
had been a valid RICO claim before it. Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 561 F. Supp. 301,
307 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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and equitable relief? Under section 1964(c) any person (that is, any
individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest
in property 78 ) who has been "injured in his business or property" 79
has standing to assert a claim to recover damages caused by racketeering activities prohibited by section 1962.80 Whether a software
owner has standing thus depends on whether software can be defined as "business or property." Although the terms "business" and
"property" have not yet been judicially interpreted under RICO, the
use of these terms in an antitrust context (after which the civil
RICO statute was modeled) provides an adequate basis for the conclusion that these terms refer to virtually anything of monetary
worth that is transferable. 81 This definition would include software.
To be awarded damages and equitable relief, plaintiff must allege and prove that it was in fact injured and that the injury was a
result of a violation of section 1962.82 Although a plaintiff need not
prove that defendant's scheme was successful in order to prove that
racketeering activity has occurred, the plaintiff must do so in order
to establish "injury" and collect damages or other relief under section 1964(c). 83 This will not be difficult in cases where software has
been misappropriated and sold.
Another advantage of RICO, currently available only to government plaintiffs, exists when the defendant has been previously convicted of a criminal RICO offense. In a civil suit brought by the
government against a defendant who has been previously convicted
under RICO's criminal provisions, the defendant is estopped from
denying any of the essential elements which the government proved
in obtaining the defendant's criminal conviction." While this estop78. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
80. Parrish, supra note 12, at 344. This has been interpreted as requiring a showing of either a racketeering enterprise injury or a competitive injury. A racketeering
enterprise injury occurs when a civil RICO defendant's ability to harm plaintiff is enhanced by infusion of money from a pattern of racketeering acts into the enterprise.
A competitive injury occurs where plaintiff is forced to compete with an enterprise
that has gained an unfair market advantage through infusion of funds from racketeering activity. Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). It is questionable whether either of these injuries need be shown, see Seville Indus. Mach.
Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146, 1157 (D.N.J. 1983), but it seems a
competitive injury would occur if a software owner were forced to compete with a
company that gained money by combining counterfeiting or misappropriation with
mail fraud, wire fraud, or interstate transportation. A similar argument can be made
in cases where a racketeering enterprise injury has occurred.
81. Parrish, supra note 12, at 344 n.41.
82. CORNELL INSTrrUTE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 58, at 667.

83. Note, supra note 73, at 1105.
84.

18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) (1982).
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pel may eventually be expanded to apply to private plaintiffs, the
current law specifically bars private plaintiffs from pleading estoppel
in such a case. 85
C. DRAFrG THE COMPLAINT
Once it is determined that a software owner has standing to
bring suit under RICO, the contents of a complaint should be outlined. In doing so, care should be taken to avoid using the word
"racketeer," since the majority of software misappropriation suits do
not involve persons who fit the stereotype image of a racketeer.
Even though there is substantial judicial precedent that RICO can
apply to white collar crimes and legitimate businesspeople, 86 it may
be best to avoid creating any undesirable connotations in the judge's
mind.
First, and most importantly, the complaint must name an enterprise in which a person, through a pattern of racketeering activity,
invested, maintained an interest, or participated. The complaint
must allege that the plaintiffs injury was caused by the conduct of
the enterprise rather than by the underlying racketeering activity itself.87 The complaint must also allege that the enterprise affects interstate commerce, and must cite facts supporting the allegation. 88
Second, care should be taken in determining who to name as defendants. It is often better to name a corporation, rather than an individual, as the defendant, since this enables the plaintiff to reach
the party with the deepest pocket. 89 Where software copying,
piracy, or trade secret misappropriation has occurred, it is rare that
the culpable individuals working within a corporation have acted
without corporate sanction. Consequently, the corporation, as well
as those individuals, should be named as a defendant.
Finally, if a violation of either the mail or wire fraud statute is
alleged, fraud must be pleaded with particularity in accordance with
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

D.

BURDEN OF PROOF, JURISDICTION AND VENUE

RICO does not define the burden of proof required to maintain a
cause of action. Early in RICO's history there was some question as
85. Id
86. See infra section IV.
87. Schact v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir. 1983).
CORNELL INSTITUTE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 58, at 664.
89. For a discussion of a corporation serving as both the enterprise and defendant, see Woodbridge, RICO: The CorporationAs "Enterprise"And Defendant, 52 U.
Cni. L. REV. 503 (1983).
88.
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to whether the reasonable doubt standard or preponderance of the
evidence standard would apply.9 0 Then in 1971 the Supreme Court
held that in cases for treble damages under antitrust laws, the ordinary or mere preponderance of evidence standard was applicable.9 1
Given this standard, at least two courts have held that the civil pro92
visions of RICO require the same burden of proof.
In RICO actions, jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested in
the district courts under section 1965(a). Venue is proper in the federal district court of the district where the defendant resides, is
93
found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.
The RICO venue provision 94 is not necessarily exclusive. The
legislative history of section 1965 reveals that it was patterned after
the venue provisions of the antitrust laws, which provide that the
general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. sections 1391 et seq. supplement the antitrust venue provisions. Interpretation of the language
and legislative history of section 1965 has led to the holding that the
venue provision of section 1965 was intended to be sufficiently broad
95
to include the venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 1391 et seq.
Venue under RICO is sufficiently broad to allow a software
owner to bring an action against most pirates, including foreign parties who are doing business in this country or who have agents here.
RICO also provides that if venue is properly laid for at least one defendant, and the software owner cannot acquire either personal jurisdiction or proper venue over other defendants in the same court,
the software owner may take advantage of the discretionary nationwide service of process and venue provisions of section 1965(b).
Section 1965(b) is potentially one of the most far reaching procedural devices of RICO. It authorizes the court to serve and join
parties over whom the court would not ordinarily have personal jurisdiction and where venue would normally be improper. The suit
need only be brought in a proper court for a least one defendant.
Once this is done, section 1965(b) authorizes any party to be joined
and brought before the court.96 This provision is particularly advan90. Long, supra note 47, at 244.
91. Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of Am., 401 U.S. 302, 307-11 (1971).
92. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1974); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (1982).
94. Id.
95. Farmers Bank of the State of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278,
1280-81 (D. Del. 1978).
96. Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO):
Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L. Q. 1009, 1039 (1980); See
also Clement v. Pehar, 575 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
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tageous for software owners attempting to bring suit against widely
scattered pirates, copiers and trade secret thieves.
IV. APPLICATION OF RICO BEYOND ORGANIZED CRIME
Early civil RICO decisions avoided extending application of
RICO to ordinary businesspeople by requiring the plaintiff to show
that the defendants were racketeers and belonged to organized
crime. 97 Congress did not wish to reduce RICO's potency by burdening the plaintiff with the difficult or impossible task of proving
the defendants' connections to organized crime. Instead Congress,
in an attempt to avoid an impossible stringent burden of proof and
possible constitutional infirmities, decided that statutory violators
without links to organized crime should also be subject to RICO's
criminal and civil sanctions. 9 8 The Supreme Court has dispelled the
minority position that RICO could not apply to legitimate business
organizations and businesspeople. 99
Despite this history, the Second Circuit, in a trio of decisions,10 0
limited the civil remedies available under RICO by ruling that private civil RICO suits may be instituted only after a defendant has
been convicted of the two criminal activities forming the basis for
the civil RICO count. The Court further ruled that future plaintiffs
must demonstrate that in addition to the criminal convictions, the
plaintiff suffered a "racketeering enterprise injury"; a type of injury
which differs from the injuries caused by the underlying violations.
Reaction to these decisions has been quick and critical. 10
Although some lower courts have followed the lead of the Second
Circuit,10 2 every circuit court which has reviewed a civil RICO count
since the trio of decisions has ruled contrary to the Second Circuit
criminal convictions or
holding and upheld the prior law that no
10 3
links to organized crime must be proven.
Until the Supreme Court acts on this confusion between the cir97. Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc, 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
98. Note, supra note 73, at 1109.
99. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 590-593 (1981); see also Morosani v.
First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 703 F.2d 1220 (lth Cir. 1983).
100. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984); Bankers Trust
Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984); Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.
1984).
101. A RICO Crisis,The National Law Journal, Aug. 13, 1984.
102. Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Atlantic
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dade Say. & Loan Ass'n, 592 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
103. Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 742 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1984); Seville
Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984); Battlefield
Builders Inc. v. Swango, 743 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., No. 83-2529 (7th Cir. Oct. 19, 1984).
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cuits, plaintiffs should seek a hospitable venue outside the Second
Circuit or file their claims in one of the twenty-two states that have
passed their own RICO laws.
V.

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION

RICO actions often involve questions of defenses that may defeat the plaintiffs case. These questions include: whether the plaintiff has standing;1° 4 whether the plaintiff has brought the action in
the correct jurisdiction; whether a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C.
section 1404 is appropriate; whether defendant is properly before the
Court; whether the enterprise affects interstate commerce; and
whether the plaintiffs injury occurred "by reason of" defendant's
conduct. 10 5 Mail and wire fraud defenses include claims that the
mailing or wire occurred before the scheme was devised or after it
reached fruition, 10 6 and that there was no fraudulent intent. 10 7 To
overcome concern over these defenses, and to strengthen the effectiveness of RICO, Congress included a unique liberal construction
clause mandating that "the provisions of this title shall be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.' ' 0 8 No other statute
in the United States Code that imposes criminal penalties has a liberal construction directive. 0 9
In drafting RICO, Congress was concerned about the general
deleterious impact of organized crime on commerce. To attack this
evil, Congress enacted a very broad and stringent act, using innovative measures to tackle a severe problem. Congress provided the
liberal construction clause to insure that RICO would have the
greatest impact on that problem.
Because there are no constitutional restrictions against Congress providing interpretational clauses, courts have no basis for refusing to obey the express liberal construction mandate in RICO in
civil actions."l 0 Courts have complied with this mandate and have
construed the civil provisions of RICO broadly. A recent Seventh
104. Plaintiff is any person injured in business or property. Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman
& Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 102 U.S. 177 (1982).
105. This defense was raised and acknowledged in Shact v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343,
1358 (7th Cir. 1983).
106. United States v. Randhoff, 525 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1975).
107. United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1982).
108. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947
(1970).
109. Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L REV. 167, 168
n.6 (1980).
110. Id. at 183-84.
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Circuit Court of Appeals decision construing the civil provisions
held:
There is no doubt that many theoretical and practical objections
may be raised to even the most routine application of RICO's civil
damage provisions. As suggested above, Congress, by granting both
plaintiff and defendant status to 'any person' who possesses the rudimentary connection with the operation of an enterprise through
predicate offenses or who suffers injury therefrom, may well have
created a runaway treble damage bonanza for the already excessively litigious. The statute, however, does not speak ambiguously,
and Congress, as RICO's legislative history indicates, was alerted to
the far-reaching implications of its enactment. The legislature having spoken, it is not our role to reassess the costs and benefits associated with the creation of a dramatically expansive, and perhaps
111
insufficiently discriminate, tool for combating organized crime.
The court also stated:
We agree that the civil sanctions provided under RICO are dramatic, and will have a vast impact upon the federal-state division of
substantive responsibility for redressing illegal conduct, but, like
most courts who have considered this issue, we believe that such
dramatic consequences are necessary incidents of the deliberately
broad swath Congress chose to cut in order to reach the evil it
without authority to restrict the applicasought; we are therefore
112
tion of the statute.
The legislative and judicial histories, coupled with the mandate
of liberal construction, insure that RICO can be used effectively in
cases of software piracy, copying and trade secret misappropriation,
not only against members of criminal organizations but also against
legitimate businesses and persons.
VI.

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

The Supreme Court has relaxed, if not entirely abolished, the
mutuality requirement where collateral estoppel is sought in a private civil action where the government has already proceeded
against the same defendant.1 3 The central issue in determining
whether a private party in a subsequent civil suit can assert collateral estoppel is whether the identical issue to which collateral estoppel is sought has been fully litigated. For collateral estoppel to
apply, the civil defendant must have had a full and fair opportunity
111. Schact v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1361 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1981)).
112. Schact v. Brown, 711 F.2d at 1353.
113. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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to argue the issue. 114 Many criminal defendants will be collaterally
estopped on several elements in a subsequent civil RICO action,
substantially enhancing the software owner's position and simplifying its case.
VII.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

It has been incorrectly assumed that since a "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity
within ten years of each other," 5 the statute of limitations for a
RICO action is ten years. In fact, RICO has no specifically enacted
statute of limitations.
It is well settled that when a federal statute creates a wholly
federal right but specifies no particular statute of limitations to govern actions under the right, the federal court applies a state statute
of limitations for an analogous type of action." 6 But under RICO,
state law offenses forming the racketeering activities are not the gravamen of the RICO offense but merely included for definitional purposes. Accordingly, the applicable statute of limitations in RICO is
determined by federal rather than state law.17 Under section 3282, a
five year statute of limitations is applicable."
VIII.

DISCOVERY UNDER RICO

Software owners bringing civil actions under RICO have broad
discovery rights provided under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Since a pattern of racketeering activity is defined as commission of two of the offenses enumerated in section 1961(1) within a
ten year period, a plaintiff may seek discovery into any transactions
in the ten years preceding the most recent commission of an act of
racketeering." 8 Discovery is limited, however, by the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 1 9 A defendant may in20
voke the privilege if there is any real possibility of prosecution.
The privilege applies to facts which directly or indirectly involve
114. SEC v. Everest Mgmt. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 167, 172-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); County
of Cook v. Lynch, 560 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
116. International Union v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
117. United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1134 (3d Cir. 1977). Some courts,
however, have looked to the forum state's statute of limitations for fraud actions. See,
e.g., State Farm & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 685 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
118. Ronald L. Mariner, Marguerite Tomkins & C. John Koch, Strategic Considerations For Civil Conspiracy Claims under RICO, Presentation to Litigation Section of
the American Bar Association, Nov. 4, 1983.
119. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 96, at 1043.
120. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 609 F.2d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 1979).
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criminal liability. 1 Any information within the privilege is precluded
12
from discovery.
Where the defendant asserts the privilege against self-incrimination, a stay can be granted and discovery delayed until termination of the criminal proceeding. 122 A more effective alternative,
however, may be a protective order under Rule 26(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. A protective order would allow discovery
to go forward but would insure that information is revealed only for
use of the parties to the action. 123 A grant of immunity may also be
sought. When this is granted, testimony given by a defendant in a
civil case may be used against that defendant in that case but not in
124
any criminal proceeding against the defendant.
It has also been argued that assertion of the privilege of selfincrimination by a civil defendant may benefit the plaintiff. By asserting the privilege, the defendant may not be allowed to testify at
trial on any issues for which the privilege was asserted, which can
125
greatly impair its defense.
CONCLUSION
With its provisions for mandatory treble damages, costs and attorneys fees, RICO is an effective weapon against modern pirates
who steal bytes instead of bullion. Software owners should not
overlook this cause of action in the war against copyright pirates
and misappropriators of trade secrets.

121. DeVita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172, 1178 (3d Cir. 1970).
122. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 96, at 1044.
123. Id.
124. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 825 (1974).
125. Rakoff & Wolff, Commercial Counterfeiting and the Proposed Trademark
Counterfeiting Act, 20 Am. Cane. L. REv. 145, 198 (1982).

